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"Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia:
One Reg i,on or Two? 11

Elizabeth Clayton

Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia:
One Region or. Two?

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has brought out the important
question in regional science of whether Soviet Central Asia ithe southern
republics of U-zbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, and Kirghizia) is in
the same

11

l"egion 11 • as is Afghanistan •.

Those who assert a regional unity

between the two· areas often imply' that the-ir similarities transcend the
the border between the Soviet Un ion and Afghanistan and weaken it.

Counter-

ing this assertion is the view that the region is more heterogeneous than
it appe·ars a-~ fTrst. glance and that the uni_ty,' particularly of religion,
is more apparent than real.
·Newhere·_is the heterogeneity of the two areas more obvious than in
the level of_economic development, which differs considerably on each
sid~of the national bcirder.

This paper· examines these differences.

Altogether, economic development indudes the improvements both in the
level of econom,ic activity and: in the qua! i ty of life.
there are substantial differences.

On both accounts,

In 1978 per capita income, the average

i:n Afghanistan ~as only $100 'per year, but in Soviet c·entr:al Asia it was
. $1200 per year.
ization;

r

Then,:! are similar differences in the levels of industrial-

Ln 'l-975< ('the .latest year for which there are comparable data),

the share of industry· i-n Afghanistan 1 s national income was 12 percent, while
it was 38 perce~ti n Uzbek i-stan, the largest of the Central Asian repub l i cs.

2

The sta.tis-tic:s for these indicator·s· are primitive, especially in Afghanistan,
whe.re one author calls: them

111

intelli.gent estimates,• i.e., wild guesses

·based on i.nadequ~te.data~.3 Neve·rthe-less, thei show economies that are quite
different in-development.
One apparent· similarity between the• two areas is the dominant role
of agricult~re in the economy, but even this sector differs considerably

2

between the two.

Its share of national income is greater in Afgl;ianistan

(about one-half) than in Soviet Central Asia (about one-third).
duction methods differ~ too.

The pro-

In Soviet Central Asia, agriculture is

commercial, mechanized, and large sea-le.

In contrast, the agricultural

production of Af.ghan i stan· takes pl ace on subsistence farms that lack
capital equipment and market little of their product.. Only one-half of
production in Afghanistan is marketed;,despitethJs low share, the marketed
portion provides 80 percent of exports.

The average landhol·ding is less

than half a hectare, the size of a private garden plot in Central Asia,, and
only two percent of landholders control

34

percent of the land.

In 1975,

the entire country had only 700 tractors, abou_t l/.300'th of the number held

. .
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in· Soviet Central Asia by about the. same number of people.
The·, goal of economic: development includes not only the methods and
galns of p,roduction_ bu.t,an improved_ quality_ of 1 ife.

One measure of the

welfare of the population. is· the Physical Qtial ity of Life (PQLI) index
develop.ed by Morris David Morris. 5; This index is c.omposed of the equally
weighted measures of infant mortality, aduJt longevity, and literacy.

It

ranges between zero (where the quaJ ity-of-life is very low) and 100 (where
it i,s. h Lgh).

A-1 though the correlation between a hi:gh income per capita and

a· high PQLI sc.ore rs positive, it is .by no means_ perfect,. and mater i a 1 goods
are not the only source of a i, i gh PQLI score, the quaJ: i ty of 1 if e may be
i'mproved by concentrating_ effort on bettering_ these important social
indicators.

On the Morris PQLI index,.Afghanistan achieves a score of only

18-, one of' the 1owe st in 'the wor 1d, wh i 1e; the Soviet Un ion achieves more
..

than 90, one of the highest.

When the data for the Soviet Central Asian

republics are separated from the rest of the Soviet Union, they are not
strictly comparable to those that David·used·, but ind.icate that Central

3

Asi·an 1 iteracy and longevity are the same .as the Soviet national ,·average but
in infant mortality, Soviet Central Asia is worse than its national average

'•

but better than Afghanistan. 6
The indicators of economi~ develo~ment and quality of life relate
cl~se1y to some demographit: differences.

The birth rate in Afghanistan is

the second highest in the world, about 51 per thousand of population per
year.

Central Asian birth rates, while high, do not approach the Afghan

level and are about 35 per. thous·and per year in Uzbekistan and 38 per
thousand per year in Tadjikistan, with a downward time

trend.

Despite lower

bTrth rates'.,. the 1:1opulat:ion growth is faster in Soviet Central Asia than in,
Afghanfs,.tan, about: 2.•B pe·rcent per yea.r in the Soviet area but only 2.0 percent per year -ih A,fg~hanlstan:7

(The data span the period 1975-8.}

The

dJfferen,c_e, of cc,urse, arises from the. exceedingiy high death rate. in
AfghanJstan,: part i·cularly among infants, as. seen by its 1ow PQLI score •
. Ohe, conseq_uence of· the high birth rate in Afghanistan is the lower

pa,rticipation of women i'ntlie labor force.

There the birth rate is high,

1 i fe is prtmi tive and. the 1 i fe expectancy of women i.s. lower .than that of
men.

(On o·avid 1 s. PQLI scores, the ranks of men and women in Afgh9nistan

are equa,1 because, the 1 ife expectancy arid 1 i teracy of. women are 1ower but
the i-nfant mor:t~,1:ity:~fmen is hi~her. 8}

In contrast, in Soviet Central

AsJa ;, the wonien outnumber the me~; i 11' the pepu latJon ( a 1though the gap was
closing in l9.70} and thE:Y parti·cipate actively in paid employment.

They

pro~ide 30~40. perc:ent of· the labor s·ervices in white col la.r occupations and
ailmcist 50 perc~nt of-~ollective,farm e~~loyment. 9

Although the Soviet

Central' Asian, farm wom~n wor_k fewer days per year than men, they contribute
an indis·pensable part of the d.ifference between the two areas in economit
growth.

4

The difference in economrt development arises not only from;people but
from capital investment, particularly in arable land.

The climate of both

areas ls arid and continental (with wide extremes of temperature) and land
for cul'tivation is scarce-.

Nomadic herding is one appropriate use of such

land and in 1978 ~bout 14 percen_t of· Afghanistan 1 s population.was in this
crass if i cat ion. H - Never the 1.ess, a nomadic- 1 i fe requires. that the density
of population is. low,.

If the output of agriculture ls to expand to provide

more food or exports, it requJres expensive investm·ent in irrigation to overcome the i'ntemperate climate and establ i-sh sedentary farming.
investment differs between the two areas.
been

Financing this

In Afghanistan, investment has

fl nanced· p r'ima riTy by foreign assJs t·ance, which of ten was undependab 1e

and:· sporad.ic-.

12

In contrast, in Soviet- Central Asia, the other republics· of
'

.

.

the union steadily.financed··rnvestment and the southern tier retained more
of Fts own tax receipts ,than the other repub 1 i cs to finance its own investments.
..

.

•.

.-

.

Capital investment: for economic development i nc.1 udes not on 1y phys i ca 1
equipmentand land, but investment in people.

In nutrition, the population

of s·ovi:et Central Asia are no lol'l'g,er nourished only by subsistence agriculture;
in 1978~ the~average rural Central Asian purchased food at retail stores that
was.- valued a,t $215 (157 -rubles).

These food pu.r,chases. al one exceeded the

aver·age incol}l~- fn-Afghan.istan .($100 pe.ryead, anci"were accompanied by
add.i dona( no~--food purchases of $26] (195 rub 1.es).
vices and facilities available
those in Afghanistan.

to

14

In health, the ser-

the· population in Soviet Central Asia exceed

In literacy; .. both men and women are 1 iterate in Soviet

Central Asia.'btit only one percent of women and twelve percent of men in

.

. _.·. 15

Af gban I stan.

5
Literacy contributes to economic development not only in better communication but in changing traditional attitude~ and skills.

The Soviet Central Asians

share an ethnic heritage with Afghanistan where the social structure is rigid,
patriarchal and religious.

This structure retards economic development in that

it rewards-people less on their efforts than on their status.

Decades ago (in

1927), the Soviet Union closed the c1 er, i_ ca 1 schools, sent non-nat i·ve educators
to Centra.1 Asia, and established a secular and technical social education
structure.

16 One clear effect is the changed status of women in Soviet Central

Asia. · In turn., this new socj a 1 structure has reduced the birth rate and infant
mortality and contribu.ted in other ways to economic development.
Despite. the changes,, the Soviet Central As-i ans and. the Afghans do share
groups who-have the,-same ethnicidentiTicat:ion.
countries share 20. mrll i0n p~ople·. rr

Onan ethnic basis, the two

In the, Soviet Union, the ethnic groups

are located almost whollyCrn ·the f6ur southern border republics of Central
Asia (Uzbekistan,. TadjTkistan, Kirghizia, and Ti.Jrkmeni·stan).

Indeed, some of

the. Afghans are peoi;?le:w.ho_ escaped.from the Soviet Union when the Russians
introduced the chang.es in soci a-1 and educational systems.

The 1argest shared

ethnic gtoup is the ij~b~k~, almost 10 million in the Soviet Union and one
mfll ion i:n Afghanistaci·: ·•· Almost as large a gr.cup are the Tadjiks, who number

3 rpoil 1-i on in the Savi_ e{ Uni on and 6 mi l1 ion in Afghanis tan.
..

-

However, the

.

d·ominani ethnic g.roup in Afghant~tan is the Pushtun, located on the southern.
border with Pakistan.•. - Thi's: grbup is not found in the Soviet population and its
..

J

ethnic heritage is shared with Pakistan.
.

'.

'

-

These ethnic gr:oups •. ·do not ·share a single language, or even a single
-

.

language fam.i ly •. - Although a 'shared_ langua.ge. measures national unity only
.

~

'

.

,

inadequately' its a,bsence SU re.ly .~ep resen ~s a source of di Vis i venes s. In
Afghanistan, the principal languages are Dari (Afghan Farsi) and Pashto,
which i:s the official language.

The source of both languages is the

6

Inda-European language family (in its Inda-Iranian branch), but the two
are not'mutually intelligible.

18

Various governments have tried to impose

Pashto as a single official language, but have failed, in part because the
traditional langua·ge of government has been Dari..

In addition, the Afghans

speak languages from other language famiHes: Ural-Altaic, Dravidian, some
Semttic~

The· languages spciken in the S~viet Union on the southern border

are predominantly fro~ the Ural-Altic fa~ily (Uzbek, Kirghiz, the Turkic
group).

Only the Tadjik language is related to Pashto, through the

Inda-European family.

Further, most Central Asians' second language . is

·

Ru.ss,i an, rather than another. tentr.al As Fan I anguage.

19

The lack of

success·rn imposing a commonlanguag.~, as in A·fghanistan, continues to
b·e an obstacle to any r:·egional Lmity~

Another. bond between the two. areas is the 1-slamic religion.

The majority

of Afghans (80 percent) belong to the Hanafi .rite of the Sunni sect; the
·
20 •· ·
.
remainder, to theSh'ia sect. · ·The two sects differ in their beliefs

about.the political succession_ to Musi Im leadership and in their codes of
law.

Among Sbviet Central Asians, the maj~rity continue to accept the

cultural.parts of the_ l_slamic relTgion but have rejected the ritual and
codes that a·rewideJ·y _acciepfed in Afghanistan.

One might expect tha~ the

Islamic bond ~ould be stiong in principle but s.trained in• practice if the
traditional and hon-I iterate Afghans were to unite with their more modern
and s.ecular counterparts · i.n the S:ov i et Uni on.
Politics ·rs the most strfking difference between these two areas.
.

.

I

The centralized, stable, and authoritarran regime of the Sovi'et Union in
Central Asia contrasts strongly with the anarchy that has been endemic in
Afghan politics for decades.

Even before the Soviet invasion, one scholar

7
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1 isted four separate political struggles within Afghanistan.
(r)

uncoordinated guerrillas who opposed any regime;

(2),

religious leaders who were conservative and opposed
these· who are moderate; their struggle is primarily
· oyer' funds, from fr i end.1 y Arabs;

· · '(i3J · muJ~hidin

(freedom-fighters.) who seek regional

· au;t:onomy from the· central gov.ei-nment in Kabu 1;

l4f ; infernal
'

,

'

-

opponents who oppose each other with in
-

·,t,heM·ajex'.i,st c~mp, primarily the Khalq and Parcham

, '.'~;a:rt+~~l■

::""

~.

,

~~

To, th~se', i.ntefiiar's:tt1;1g.gles
now is added the Soviet invasion, .and it
:·-'
.. - '·
. .'

is unclear w_hether.

fh~: Afghans
.
,,:

' Neverthkf~~~;'

hi'stb!

can unite against _the fore.igner.

-

the cost
.

are·a .i,'s

'.

to the Russi ans of imposing order on' this

,,-

Alre~'dy their casual.ties_ reportedly number 1000 dead and

6000-8000 wounded· fr~rij'~force of 80,000, and domination is not in
Refugees from Afg_h~n i' stan number one. rri i 11 ion in Pakistan and

s;iglit.

'..

· · .··, .•
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l00,0:00-6Q0,0_00 in _Iran •.. ·.

The. unifTcation. of Afghanistan seems unlikely

under· any c;lr-~umsiJnce:~,: i~~l~ding. a Russian mi.l itary domination.

A

scho.1 ar who h~s. sttiifi:~:~ A{ghani stan for· ·years says.: "The hawks wi 11 pi ck
.the ·bones o,f tfre

Af~h·~n-

n·a~J~n unti.l nothing. is left, but many Russian

so-ld:iers w:{1•(':g~,(··~t,e.·p•ride .• 1123' .·
., One r;~a?;C)n• forfocusing on th:eSbroadl y-deflned economic differences between Afgh~n i·s·tan. ahd: ·sov+et C~ntra 1, Asia is that the early reports in the
~'

•

,.

,

••

'

-,

J

-

Soviet Un ion oi' tbe. in,.~·asfon. into Afghanistan ass.erted that the Russi ans
had been

11

tnvl'ted11 . for purposes _o.f econom i-c deve 1opment. . Accepting for a

moment this argument, it is possible that the opposition in Afghanistan
.. ·

represents a rebuke to modernization as well ·as to.the Russians. ·The

8

intellectual history of attftudes toward tjevelopment and its political,
social, and economic change has swung between optimism and pessimism.
Traciing these atti·tudfnal cycles, Samuel P. Huntington has shown that the
Victorians were optimistic. as they espoused evolution and an inevitable
success.

Thls was foll-0wed

bi the

pessimism of the 1930s, as the dis-

integrative effects o.f industrialization and democratization were followed
by a totalitarian response.

After World War 11, optimism returned with

lively pros.pee.ts for world wide economic development. 24

The political dis-

putes internal to. Afghanistan suggest a return to pessimism about -economic
development.
This is ·not to ,say that the Russian iiwasion is· irrelevant or justified,
.

.

but th~t- it may have exace.rbated an opposition to modernization that already
was in p,lace. _ Thi~;p~per started w-ith the suggestion of regional unity and
homogenei-ty, but this i'A-cludes a hidden belief that political unity is
likely to fo-llow, and this outcome s.eems impossible in the near future
.

.

even by military dom:inat.ion~

Some ·political· fostabi 1 ity inevitably

accompan res economic development, especially when it is rap id and when
- '-.'

-

.

.

it overrides local choices conce;riing investment and demographic policies.
One response is t~- impose an auth<:>ritarian government; but thi? has failed. 25
. Another

ts to r~J~ct e~onomlc development.

development'

tci

A third prospect is to weld

a·: t:rad·i tJona 1- · and conservative society.

Afghan is tan and

its surround;fog area are a- microcosm of these social choices, quite apart
from the Sov+~t. i'ilvas ion •.
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